goods, the Copyright Office soon settled on a formulation that could accommodate the statuettes in Mazer while excluding the general realm of industrial design. 24 It was the first appearance of the "separability" standard.
During the laborious efforts to amend the federal copyright statute that had begun soon after the decision in Mazer, the Copyright Office consistently counseled against any expansion of copyright into industrial design, emphasizing the potential anticompetitive consequences of broad (and lengthy) copyright protection for commercial goods. 25 Attention focused instead on design protection legislation that would be separate from both copyright and design patent. 26 The Senate formally joined design protection with copyright reform in 1969, adding it as Title II of the general copyright revision bill. 27 Title II offered protection for the "original ornamental design of a useful article," with "staple or commonplace" designs and designs "dictated solely by a utilization function of the article" excluded. 28 It met the fate of its many predecessors. As explained by the House Judiciary Committee, [T] he Committee will have to examine further the assertion of the Department of Justice, which testified in opposition to the Title, that Title II would create a new monopoly which has not been justified by a showing that its benefits will outweigh the disadvantage of removing such designs from free public use. 29 24 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959) ("If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation, which can be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for registration."). 25 COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG. 13 (Comm. Print 1961) ("In the years since the Mazer decision, full protection under the copyright law has not proved inappropriate for 'works of art' used as a design or decoration of useful articles. We do not believe, however, that it would be appropriate to extend the copyright law to industrial designs as such."). 26 The idea was hardly novel. "Since 1914, approximately seventy design protection bills have been introduced in Congress, none of which has been enacted into law." Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Proponents of design protection did eventually break through when Chapter 13 was added to Title 17 of the U.S. Code in 1998. 30 Chapter 13 creates an elaborate scheme of protection for "an original design of a useful article which makes the article attractive or distinctive in appearance to the purchasing or using public . . . ." 31 However, in what may pass for legislative humor, for purposes of Chapter 13, a "useful article" is defined only as "a vessel or boat hull." 32 The 1976 Copyright Act broke little new ground on useful articles. It contains a narrow codification of Mazer, stating in § 113(a) that the exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted work "includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise." 33 The "works of art" category of the 1909 Act was abandoned, replaced by "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works." 34 The definition of that category incorporates the Copyright Office's separability standard so that designs of useful articles 35 are within its scope only if they contain features "that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of" the article's utilitarian aspects. 34 Id. § 102(a)(5). 35 The Copyright Office regulations had demanded separability only when "the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility" (emphasis added). See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Articles serving both aesthetic and utilitarian ends were arguably beyond the reach of the limitation, and thus useful articles that could also pass as "art" could escape the separability requirement. See, e.g., Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (pencil sharpener simulating the appearance of an antique telephone copyrightable since utility was not its "sole intrinsic function"). The 1976 Act's definition of "useful article" substituted "an intrinsic utilitarian function" for "sole intrinsic function." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added) (definition of "useful article"). Although the definition closes the loophole in the former regulation, its broadened scope creates new uncertainty. See, e.g., Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L. Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1973) (toy airplane "has no intrinsic utilitarian function"). 36 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"). [T]he Committee is seeking to draw as clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrightable works of industrial design. A two-dimensional painting, drawing, or graphic work is still capable of being identified as such when it is printed on or applied to utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, containers, and the like. The same is true when a statute [sic] or carving is used to embellish an industrial product or, as in the Mazer case, is incorporated into a product without losing its ability to exist independently as a work of art. On the other hand, although the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee's intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television set, or any other industrial product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrightable under the bill. The test of separability and independence from "the utilitarian aspects of the article" does not depend upon the nature of the designthat is, even if the appearance of an article is determined by esthetic (as opposed to functional) considerations, only elements, if any, which can be identified separately from the useful article as such are copyrightable. 37 "Applied art," as in Mazer, still enjoys protection, but "industrial design," even if aesthetically pleasing, is excluded from copyright by the separability standard that befuddled the Supreme Court in Star Athletica.
III. STAR ATHLETICA-WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SAID
Varsity Brands designs, manufacturers, and markets apparel and accessories used in cheerleading. 38 Among its products were five cheerleading uniforms onto which two-dimensional designs had been incorporated by sewing or heat transfer. 39 The designs, consisting of lines, curves, stripes, angles, and diagonals in various colors, had been created by Varsity employees who sketched them on paper with no ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) • DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2018.574 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu instructions or limitations from the clothing production department. 40 The designs were accepted for registration by the Copyright Office as "2-dimensional artwork." 41 Varsity claimed that Star Athletica had copied the designs for its own cheerleading uniforms and sued for copyright infringement.
42
The defendant won a summary judgment following Judge Cleland's determination that the designs were not copyrightable. 43 Noting with some understatement that "there is considerable disagreement regarding the proper standard to apply when considering whether elements of protectable [pictorial, graphic, and sculptural] works are separable from their utilitarian function," Judge Cleland held that the designs were not separable from the utilitarian aspects of the uniforms. 44 He justified that conclusion by observing that the uniform "loses its utilitarian functionality as a cheerleading uniform" when the design is removed, 45 and even when viewed on its own, the design "evokes the image and concept of a cheerleading uniform."
46
The defendant's summary judgment was vacated by the Sixth Circuit, which held the designs to be copyrightable. 47 After reciting nine differing standards for determining separability, Judge Moore settled on a "hybrid" approach that borrowed elements from several of the earlier tests.
48
The court ultimately concluded that the graphic features could be identified separately and could exist independently of the utilitarian aspects of the uniforms, noting, for example, that the designs could be transferred onto other articles such as shirts, jackets, and skirts. 49 Judge McKeague, in dissent, echoed the lower court's conclusion that the designs could not be separated from the utilitarian aspects of the uniforms because they were integral to identifying the wearer as a cheerleader.
50
Judge Moore's majority opinion countered 40 Id. at *2. 41 Id. 42 Id. at *1. 43 Id. 44 Id. at *6. 45 Id. at *8. 46 Id. at *9. Although the Supreme Court sought to oblige, "clarification" is not necessarily an apt description of its efforts.
There was no dispute that Varsity's uniforms were "useful articles." 53 However, Varsity argued that the two-dimensional designs copied by Star Athletica appeared on the useful articles; they were not designs of useful articles subject to the separability test under § 101. 54 The proposition that separability does not apply to two-dimensional works that have been applied to useful articles has been forcefully asserted by William Patry, author of a treatise on copyright law.
55
Justice Thomas quotes Patry as declaring, "Courts looking at two-dimensional design claims should not apply the separability analysis regardless of the three-dimensional form that design is embodied in."
56
It is not a defensible proposition. As Justice Thomas notes, the statement of the separability test in § 101 specifically refers to "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features" that can be separated from the utilitarian aspects of a useful article, 57 and "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" specifically include "two-dimensional" works.
58
Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion, raises a more sophisticated objection to the necessity of a separability analysis.
59
Section 113(a) of the Copyright Act grants the owner of a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work the exclusive right to 51 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining "useful article") ("A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information."). 57 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added) (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"). 58 Id. Indeed, the legislative history of § 101 uses a series of examples involving two-dimensional works to illustrate the operation of the separability standard. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 59 See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
60
A painter, for example, has the exclusive right to reproduce her painting on a vase, and thus has a claim for infringement against another who does so without permission. The separability analysis is irrelevant to such a case since the work in which the author claims copyright was not part of the design of a useful article. Undoubtedly influenced by a law review article written by her daughter, Jane Ginsburg, 61 Justice Ginsburg argued that the works at issue in Star Athletica were "standalone" pictorial and graphic works that had been created on paper and registered at the Copyright Office as twodimensional artworks. 62 Thus, the works were copyrightable without regard to separability and the case should be controlled by § 113(a).
63
Justice Thomas for the majority declined to engage that contention directly, arguing that although the issue had been raised by the United States as amicus curiae, it had not been advanced by the parties.
64
Justice Thomas did, however, address the relationship between § 113(a) and § 101's separability standard in the course of applying the separability standard to Varsity's designs; "[s]ection 101 is, in essence, the mirror image of § 113(a). Whereas § 113(a) protects a work of authorship first fixed in some tangible medium other than a useful article and subsequently applied to a useful article, § 101 protects art first fixed in the medium of a useful article."
Taken literally, that statement calls into question the Court's own analysis. Varsity's designs were first fixed on paper and only later applied to the uniforms. Section 101's separability standard thus appears irrelevant, and Varsity should prevail merely by asserting its exclusive right under § 113(a) to reproduce its copyrighted works on useful articles. According to Mazer v. Stein, the fact that Varsity created the works with the intention of 60 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012). 61 See Ginsburg, supra note 37. Justice Ginsburg cites the article in a footnote only for the proposition that the separability test "has resisted coherent application." Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1018 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 62 137 S. Ct. at 1018. The fact that Varsity Brands registered more than two hundred two-dimensional uniform designs, id. at 1007, prompts Lili Levi to worry about the risk of market foreclosure. See Lili Levi, The New Separability, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 709 (2018). However, since a defendant will be liable for copyright infringement only if it actually copies the design, copyright registrations themselves do not create the same market foreclosure risks associated with patent aggregations. 63 See id.; see also Ginsburg, supra note 37, at 21-24 (reaching the same conclusion). 64 137 S. Ct. at 1009. Varsity's copyright registrations for "2-dimensional artwork," however, were clearly part of the record before the Court. Id. 65 Id. It is an odd comparison since § 101's definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" goes to the subject matter eligible for copyright protection, whereas § 113(a) amplifies the exclusive rights granted to eligible subject matter. See 17 U.S.C. § § 101, 113(a) (2012). 
67
Nevertheless, the Court's decision to invoke the separability standard is probably wise. Treating Varsity's designs as standalone works subject to § 113(a) simply because they were created prior to the actual manufacture of the cheerleading uniforms would leave very little within the scope of § 101's separability test. Useful articles are not typically designed or produced in a single step as a full-blown whole. Instead, individual elements are more likely to be created first on paper or on a computer with the intention of ultimately incorporating them into a finished product. If fixation prior to incorporation into a useful article is the touchstone, almost any design element could plausibly claim the status of a pre-existing standalone work eligible for copyright without regard to separability. Application of the separability standard is warranted in Star Athletica, despite the prior creation of the designs, because Varsity itself chose to incorporate the designs into the useful articles that were subsequently copied by Star Athletica.
68
A defendant who copies elements of a useful article may have no knowledge of the design history of the article, and thus would be unable to assess whether an element is copyrightable if applicability of the separability standard turns on the order of creation. The statuette in Mazer, for example, was created prior to its use by the owner in lamps, 69 yet the legislative history of § 101's separability test uses Mazer as an illustration of separability.
70
Section 113(a) is best reserved for truly standalone works-works the creator has not herself applied to a useful article that has been reproduced by a copier.
After concluding that a separability analysis was necessary in order to assess the copyrightability of Varsity's designs, the Court set out its interpretation of the applicable standard: "We hold that a feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two-or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would 66 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) ("We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration."). 67 137 S. Ct. at 1011 ("Two of Mazer's holdings are relevant here. First, the Court held that the respondents owned a copyright in the statuette even though it was intended for use as a lamp base."). 68 Id. at 1018. 69 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202. 70 See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington Mills, Inc., 784 F.3d 1404 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying the separability standard to uphold copyright in a digital photograph applied by the copyright owner to laminate flooring subsequently copied by a competitor). qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work-either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression-if it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated."
71
One obvious characteristic of the Court's formulation is that it largely paraphrases the statutory text in § 101.
72
Another is the formal division of the "identified separately" and "capable of existing independently" elements in the § 101 definition. Although some courts had treated the standard as a more unified whole, 73 the distinction is unlikely to affect results, particularly in light of the limited role played by the first element in the Court's analysis. 74 Except for a brief reference rejecting two "objective" components derived from earlier cases, 75 the Court declined to comment on any of the multiple tests surveyed below by the Sixth Circuit, nor did it discuss or cite any of the numerous scholarly articles offering analysis and commentary on the separability standard.
76
Several of the Court's general comments on separability merit attention. Star Athletica argued Varsity's designs were not separable from the cheerleading uniforms because the uniforms would not be equally useful without them-the designs identified the wearer as a cheerleader and enhanced the wearer's appearance. That proposition had previously been in doubt. For example, the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices then in effect took the position that a feature was separable if it could be "physically removed without altering the useful aspects of the article" or if "the artistic feature and the useful article could both exist side by side and be perceived as fully realized, separate works." 79 As Justice Thomas notes, a requirement that extraction of the feature must leave the utility of the useful article intact is inconsistent with Mazer.
80
With the statuette removed, "the 'lamp' would be just a shade, bulb, and wires." 81 Removal of a graphic pattern from a textile fabric may decrease the fabric's usefulness in upholstery or dress-making, but the design nevertheless remains copyrightable as a separable work.
82
Justice Thomas extracted a corollary from his conclusion that the utility of the useful article need not remain intact after separation of the copyrightable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work.
83
The legislative history of § 101's separability test states that the standard can be met if the element is "physically or conceptually" separable.
84
That distinction has made repeated appearances in the case law.
85
It has also formed the basis for scholarly 86 and administrative 87 analysis. Interpreting physical separability to mean that a feature can "be physically separated from the 78 Id.
79 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 924.2(A)-(B) (3d ed. 2014). See also, e.g., 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at § 2.5.3 ("[P]rotectible if it can be physically separated from the article without impairing the article's utility" or "conceptually separable if it can stand on its own as a work of art traditionally conceived, and if the useful article in which it is embodied would be equally useful without it."). 80 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1014. 81 
Id.
82 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. See also Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington Mills, Inc., 784 F.3d 1404 (11th Cir. 2015) (digital photograph applied by the copyright owner to laminate flooring held separable). 83 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1014. 84 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. This revision is unlikely to have substantive consequences. A feature that can be removed from the useful article with a hacksaw should have no trouble being "imaginatively separated" from the article.
92
One general comment in the Court's opinion is particularly unsettling: "An artistic feature that would be eligible for copyright protection on its own cannot lose that protection simply because it was first created as a feature of the design of a useful article, even if it makes that article more useful."
93
In context, the statement is merely a reiteration of the Court's relatively uncontroversial conclusion that the utility of the useful article need not remain intact after separation of the copyrightable feature. That the lamp in Mazer will not function without the separated statuette, for example, does not preclude copyright protection. Literally, however, the Court's statement can be read to go much further, welcoming into copyright features whose specific designs improve the functioning of useful articles. Varsity's design patterns on its cheerleading uniforms are copyrightable, but what of a mesh pattern shown to be particularly effective in keeping the wearer cool, or a specific pattern of light and dark shapes on a jacket shown to provide superior camouflage for deer hunters? Extending copyright protection to the functional aspects of useful articles would represent a dramatic expansion. Courts and commentators have consistently interpreted the separability standard to exclude features whose designs contribute to an article's function. 94 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Mazer spoke of protecting the 88 137 S. Ct. at 1014 (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 79, § 924.2(A)). 89 Id. 90 Id. 91 Id. 92 Id. ("Because we reject the view that a useful article must remain after the artistic feature has been imaginatively separated from the article, we necessarily abandon the distinction between 'physical' and 'conceptual' separability . . . ."). 93 Id. (emphasis added). 94 See, e.g., Chosun Int'l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F. The conclusion is rooted in a recognition of the channeling function of the separability test, pushing technical innovations into the patent regime, with its more exacting requirements of novelty and inventiveness and its shorter term of protection.
96
The Supreme Court itself has been careful to maintain a similar distinction between the subject matters of trademark and patent protection.
97
The language of the separability test supports this fundamental limitation on copyrightable subject matter. Section 101 demands that the feature be identified separately from and be capable of existing independently of "the utilitarian aspects of the article." 98 A feature whose specific design improves the functioning of a useful article hardly seems separate and independent of the article's "utilitarian aspects." To maintain the basic distinction between copyright and patent, the Court's reference to features that make the article more useful should be interpreted to refer only to the fact that the useful article need not be functional once the separated feature is removed, as in Mazer. If the specific Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 924 (11th Cir. 1983) ("The wire wheel covers in this case are not superfluous ornamental designs, but functional components of utilitarian articles."); 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 3:26 (2017) ("If the feature or combination of features does not serve to assist the article in performing its functional purpose, it can be protected by copyright."); 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 2.5.3 ("[I]t seems appropriate to place designs of useful articles that are not essential to the utility of the useful article on the copyrightable side of the line."); Moffat, supra note 76, at 663-64 ("[R]equiring proof that the aspects sought to be protected are not functional-or useful-by demonstrating that they are not essential to the item's operation and do not affect the cost or quality of the item."). f an artist claimed copyright protection for his design of the shape of an automobile, for example, and the shape of the car made it more aerodynamic, then allowing protection for the artist's design might limit the availability of cars with this improvement in aerodynamics . . . . Protecting the shape via copyright might thus afford the artist a de facto patent on an industrial innovation that would otherwise not satisfy the more rigorous requirements necessary to obtain a patent, as opposed to a copyright."); 1 ABRAMS, supra note 94 ("In short, a court should ask whether a given feature or combination of features serves the purpose of making the article work, or work better. If the feature or combination of features serves this purpose, it is properly protected by patent and only by patent."); Moffat, supra note 76, at 620-21 ("[T]he useful article doctrine is a channeling doctrine, meant to direct works away from the copyright realm and toward patent law, the public domain, or, perhaps, some other form of protection."). design of the feature is itself important to the article's utility, it should not be considered separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article.
There are at least two indications, however, that the Court may have intended what it literally said. In announcing its new test to determine separability, the Court twice misstates the statutory language. Justice Thomas requires for copyrightability that the feature can be perceived "separate from the useful article," and would qualify for copyright if "imagined separately from the useful article." 99 The statute, however, requires separation, not from the useful article, but from "the utilitarian aspects" of the useful article. The latter is a more exacting standard that is more likely to exclude features that contribute to an article's utility. The Court's misstatement is odd, given how closely the Court's test otherwise adheres to the statutory language. There is another comment in the Court's opinion that may support copyright protection even for functional features. Although again stated in the context of emphasizing that the useful article need not remain useful after separation, Justice Thomas said, "The statute does not require that we imagine a nonartistic replacement for the removed feature to determine whether that feature is capable of an independent existence." 100 This might indicate that the Court did indeed intend to include even designs that are specifically necessary to the optimal functioning of the useful article.
Judges and lawyers struggling to push back against allowing copyright in features that make an article more useful can emphasize that Justice Thomas' entire discussion of the utility of the identified feature, and of the elements of the useful article left behind, is arguably dicta. The discussion came in response to defendant Star Athletica's contention that Varsity's designs could not be protected because without them the uniforms would not be equally useful. But according to Star Athletica, the utilitarian aspects of the uniforms to which the designs contribute are "identifying the wearer as a cheerleader and enhancing the wearer's physical appearance." 101 Neither purpose, however, may count as a "utilitarian function" under § 101's definition of a "useful article." That definition excludes the functions of portraying the appearance of the article or conveying information. the wearer as a cheerleader is an informational function, and enhancing the wearer's appearance may well be attributed to the mere appearance of the article itself. 103 Thus, the designs may not have contributed to the "utility" of the dresses at all, and hence it was unnecessary to decide whether a useful article must be equally useful without the separated features. Another doctrinal tool may also become increasingly relevant as part of post-Star Athletica efforts to maintain the traditional separation between copyright and patent. 104 The Court in Star Athletica did not hold that Varsity's designs were protected by copyright-merely that they were "separable from the uniforms and eligible for copyright protection." 105 "We do not today hold that the surface decorations are copyrightable." 106 Like all works seeking the benefits of copyright protection, separable design features must still satisfy the usual requirements of fixation, originality, and creativity. 107 Features whose designs reflect functional necessities due to the lack of alternatives designs capable of fulfilling that utilitarian function may be barred from copyright by the merger doctrine. 108 The impact of Star Athletica will turn primarily on the interpretation of its test for separability. That test bears repeating:
Inc., 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990) (animal nose masks are not useful articles since their only utility derives from portraying their appearance). 103 Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 37, at 23 ("'aesthetic functionality' is not a utilitarian function in the copyright sense"). 104 See supra note 96. 105 137 S. Ct. at 1012 (footnote omitted). 106 Id. at 1012 n.1. here is a significant risk that some courts, when applying the new two-part test, will afford copyright protection to utilitarian features of useful articles that should be left in the public domain."). We hold that a feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two-or threedimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work-either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression-if it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated. 109 How is this test likely to be interpreted?
IV. STAR ATHLETICA-WHAT IT MIGHT MEAN

A. Separate Identification
The first element of the Supreme Court's new test for copyright in the designs of useful articles requires that the design "can be perceived as a two-or threedimensional work of art separate from the useful article."
110
To Justice Thomas, this criterion appears to be little more than a requirement of specific identification. "The first requirement-separate identification-is not onerous. The decisionmaker need only be able to look at the useful article and spot some two-or three-dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities." The requirement thus serves to define the boundaries of the plaintiff's claim. In a subsequent reiteration of the issue, Justice Thomas rephrased the two elements: "The ultimate separability question, then, is whether the feature for which copyright protection is claimed" would satisfy the second of the Court's criteria. The separate identification element apparently serves a function analogous to the general requirement of fixation. Copyright is available only to works that are "fixed in any tangible medium of 109 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007. 110 Id. at 1007, 1016. 111 Id. at 1010. 112 Id. at 1011. 113 Id. at 1012. 114 Id. Read literally, the first element sets a higher-and more uncertainbenchmark. In the two most formal recitations of the element, Justice Thomas speaks of perceiving a two-or three-dimensional "work of art" separate from the useful article.
U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L A W R E V I E
117
That description invites mischief. "Work of art" is not a category of copyrightable work under the 1976 Act.
118
The phrase may prompt litigants or judges to incorporate assessments of artistic merit into the determination of separability, with the inevitable discrimination in favor of representational or traditional art. 119 However, there is no indication that the Court intended to invite such an inquiry. Justice Thomas appears to have employed the "work of art" terminology simply as shorthand for the statutory category of "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural" work. In his application of the first element to the designs of the cheerleading uniforms, for example, he separately identifies the decorations not as "works of art," but as "features having pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities."
120
In another description of the criterion, Justice Thomas speaks of spotting "some two-or three-dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities."
121
It would be unfortunate if the apparently casual reference to "work of art" prompts courts to engraft an assessment of artistic merit onto the first of the Court's required elements.
B. Independent Existence
The second part of the Court's test requires that the separately identified twoor three-dimensional feature "would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work-either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression-if it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is 115 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 116 See, e.g., Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 304-05 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Moreover, a garden is simply too changeable to satisfy the primary purpose of fixation; its appearance is too inherently variable to supply a baseline for determining questions of copyright creation and infringement."). This is a perplexing criterion. Literally, the test seems to add little to the first criteria, which requires the identification of a two-or three-dimensional element. The definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" includes "twodimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art . . . ."
123
Virtually all two-or three-dimensional features imaginatively separated from a useful article would appear to be pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works under that definition.
124
A subsequent attempt to explain the requirement does little to clarify its scope. "The ultimate separability question, then, is whether the feature for which copyright protection is claimed would have been eligible for copyright protection as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work had it originally been fixed in some tangible medium other than a useful article before being applied to a useful article."
125
This too initially appears to exclude almost nothing, since if the two-or three-dimensional feature had not been part of a useful article, it would have been eligible for protection as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work under the statutory definition. Perhaps the most significant-and Delphic-comment by the Court is its statement that "[i]f the feature is not capable of existing as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work once separated from the useful article, then it was not a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature of that article, but rather one of its utilitarian aspects."
126
How can a separated two-or three-dimensional feature not be capable of existing as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work? The answer to that question, and the heart of the Court's separability analysis, lies in the opening sentence of the succeeding paragraph of Justice Thomas' opinion: "[o]f course, to qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work on its own, the feature cannot itself be a useful article or '[a]n article that is normally a part of a useful article' (which is itself considered a useful article)."
127
The requirement that the extracted feature "would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work" if imagined separately is apparently intended to test whether that feature is itself still a useful article. The feature need not be a "whole" useful article; as Justice Thomas notes, the definition of "useful article" includes features that are "normally a part of a useful article."
130
This interpretation appears to be confirmed by the Court's application of the test to the designs incorporated into the cheerleading uniforms. After identifying the designs as two-dimensional features separate from the uniforms under the first element of its test, Justice Thomas applied the second criterion and found that the separated designs would qualify for protection under § 101. 131 He specifically emphasized that "imaginatively removing the surface decorations from the uniforms and applying them in another medium would not replicate the uniform itself." 132 That is, identifying and imaginatively separating the designs does not bring along the useful article-the cheerleading uniforms. This prohibition against copyright in separated features that "replicate" a useful article, in whole or in part, is central to the Court's analysis, and indeed explains the disagreement between the majority and Justices Breyer and Kennedy, who would hold that the designs are not separable from the cheerleading uniforms and hence are uncopyrightable.
133
Their dispute is in essence an argument about what counts as a "replication" of a useful article that precludes the separated design feature from qualifying as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work on its own.
To Justice Breyer, separately-identified design features that create a "picture" of the useful article thereby "replicate" it and are thus ineligible for copyright. 131 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1012. 132 Id. 133 Id. at 1030 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 134 Id. at 1031 ("A picture of the relevant design features, whether separately 'perceived' on paper or in the imagination, is a picture of, and thereby 'replicate[s],' the underlying useful article of which they are part."). 135 Id. In many or most cases, to decide whether a design or artistic feature of a useful article is conceptually separate from the article itself, it is enough to imagine the feature on its own and ask, "Have I created a picture of a (useful part of a) useful article?" If so, the design is not separable from the useful article. If not, it is. 137 This conception of replication led directly to his conclusion that Varsity's designs were not separable from the underlying uniforms: "Were I to accept the majority's invitation to 'imaginatively remov[e]' the chevrons and stripes as they are arranged on the neckline, waistline, sleeves, and skirt of each uniform, and apply them on a 'painter's canvas,'. . . that painting would be of a cheerleader's dress." 138 Justice Thomas responded directly: "[t]he dissent argues that the designs are not separable because imaginatively removing them from the uniforms and placing them in some other medium of expression-a canvas, for example-would create 'pictures of cheerleader uniforms.' . . . This is not a bar to copyright." 139 He offered the example of a decorated guitar.
[C]onsider, for example, a design etched or painted on the surface of a guitar. If that entire design is imaginatively removed from the guitar's surface and placed on an album cover, it would still resemble the shape of a guitar. But the image on the cover does not 'replicate' the guitar as a useful article. 140 If the purpose of the "replication" inquiry is to distinguish features that can qualify separately as protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works from features that are ineligible because they are useful articles, Justice Breyer's conception of "replication" is off the mark. A picture of a useful article is not itself a useful article under the statutory definition since its only utilitarian function is to portray its appearance or convey information.
141
Such a picture fits comfortably within the statute's definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works." 142 More importantly, permitting copyright protection for separated design features that might "picture" the useful article does not give the copyright owner any exclusive rights in 137 Id. at 1033. 138 Id. at 1035. 139 Id. at 1012 (majority opinion). 140 
Id.
141 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of "useful article"). 142 See id. (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"). the "pictured" article itself. Both the majority and dissent clearly recognize this fact. As Justice Thomas notes, "Nor could someone claim a copyright in a useful article merely by creating a replica of that article in some other medium . . . . Although the replica could itself be copyrightable, it would not give rise to any rights in the useful article that inspired it." 143 Justice Breyer agrees, citing § 113(b) for the proposition that copyright in a work portraying a useful article does not extend to the manufacture of the article itself. 144 Thus, there is no reason to deny copyright protection to separately-identified features of a useful article solely on the ground that they continue to depict or picture the useful article after separation.
It is unfortunate the Supreme Court chose a dispute involving graphic designs on cheerleading uniforms as the vehicle to expound on the rules governing copyright in useful articles. Two-dimensional design cases are usually straightforward. The two-dimensional features are easily identified and imaginatively separated from the underlying useful article, and the separated features themselves will almost never be 143 137 S. Ct. at 1010. 144 Id. at 1033 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Section 113(b) of the Copyright Act does not actually state that copyright in a work that portrays a useful article affords no protection against the manufacture of the depicted article. 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012). Instead, it states that the copyright owner of such a work has no "greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of the useful article so portrayed" than those afforded under the law prior to the effective date of the 1977 Act. Id disqualified as a useful article. They would be copyrightable under virtually any understanding of separability. As the legislative history notes, "A two-dimensional painting, drawing, or graphic work is still capable of being identified as such when it is printed on or applied to utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, containers, and the like." 145 Resolving a dispute over three-dimensional features might have propelled the Court toward a more nuanced analysis.
C. Three-Dimensional Design Features
The first of the Court's two requirements for copyright-separate identification-is no more troublesome for three-dimensional features than for twodimensional designs. "The decisionmaker need only be able to look at the useful article and spot some two-or three-dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities."
146
A three-dimensional design feature clearly possesses "sculptural qualities." The second requirement-independent existence-is potentially more problematic for three-dimensional features since, unlike two-dimensional designs, they are more likely to still be "useful articles" and thus less likely to satisfy the criteria that the feature "qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work" if imagined separately.
147
This is especially true in view of the fact that "[a]n article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article. '" 148 Three-dimensional designs, in other words, are more likely to "replicate" in whole or in part the useful article from which they have been separated.
When is a three-dimensional design feature still a useful article (or a normal part thereof) and thus unprotectable as a sculptural work even when imagined separately? Obviously, the fact that the three-dimensional feature was literally a part of a useful article cannot itself disqualify the feature under the separability test since no feature would then ever survive the test. The Court's endorsement of Mazer and its dancing figure lamp base also emphasizes that the focus is on the "separately 145 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55. Testifying on Copyright Office practices under its earlier separability regulation, the Register of Copyrights stated, "[V]irtually all original two-dimensional designs for useful articles, such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, floor tiles, painted or printed decorations, and so forth, were subject to copyright registration." HEARINGS ON H.R. 2223 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON itself rather than the generic role the feature plays in the useful article. A lamp base, for example, is presumably "normally a part of a useful article," but a dancing figure is not, and it therefore remains eligible for copyright as a sculptural work despite its utilitarian use as a lamp base.
150
Justice Thomas was also clear that the marketability of the separately-imagined feature as a work of art is irrelevant, citing the danger of "substitut[ing] judicial aesthetic preferences for the policy choices embodied in the Copyright Act." 151 The marketability test is chiefly associated with Professor Melville Nimmer, author of a standard treatise on copyright law.
152
The test had made periodic appearances in the case law.
153
It required predictions about markets that typically did not exist and seemed a questionable proxy for separability since some clearly separable designs-wallpaper patterns, for example-might have no independent market value as art. More generally, the opinions in Star Athletica leave no role for assessments of artistic merit in determining whether a separated feature is a useful article and is hence unprotectable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work. An imagined-as-art test had occasionally been propounded by scholars 154 and judges. 154 See Perlmutter, supra note 37, at 377 (emphasizing "the ordinary observer's ability to perceive the object as a work of art"). 155 See, e.g., Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington Mills, Inc., 784 F.3d 1404, 1414 (11th Cir. 2015) (wood grain design might be framed and hung on the wall as art); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 423 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting) (inquiring whether an observer could conceive of the design as a work of art without at the same time contemplating its utilitarian function); KieselsteinCord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (separating the "primary ornamental aspect" from the "subsidiary utilitarian function"). Contra Brandir Int'l v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d Cir. 1987) ("It is unnecessary to determine whether to the art world the RIBBON Rack properly would be considered an example of minimalist sculpture. The result under the copyright statute is not changed."); Carol Barnhart, supra, at 419 n.5 ("Almost any utilitarian article may be viewed by some separately as art . . . ."). Results that turn on aesthetic appreciation cannot implement the legislative distinction between applied art and industrial design. Justice Breyer in dissent was at pains to emphasize the danger of a test focused on "whether the design can be imagined as a 'two-or three-dimensional work of art.'" 157 Justice Thomas appeared to appreciate the concern; "[b]ut a shovel, like a cheerleading uniform, even if displayed in an art gallery, is 'an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function . . . . '" 158 Consider the "shape, cut, and dimensions" of a cheerleading uniform or the shape of a shovel. Both are outside the scope of copyright according to Justice Thomas despite their obvious three-dimensional sculptural qualities.
159
Why are they disqualified as useful articles while the Mazer statuette employed as a lamp base is not? The answer can be found in the definition of a "useful article." Having a utilitarian function is not itself sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition. The utilitarian function must be "intrinsic" to the article. 160 A sculpture of a dancing figure can be used as a doorstop, paperweight, lamp base, bookend, hat rack, even a hammer, etc. But those functions are arguably not "intrinsic" to the article, and thus the sculpture, once identified and imagined separately from any useful article of which it may be part, is protectable as a sculptural work that satisfies the test of separability propounded in Star Athletica. 161 We also know from Mazer that the fact that a design was created with a specific utilitarian function in mind is not in itself sufficient to make that function "intrinsic" and thus make the resulting article a "useful article." The statuettes held copyrightable in that case were specifically created for use as lamp bases.
162
The three-dimensional design features of a dress or a shovel, on the other hand, are apparently considered by the Court to have intrinsic utilitarian functions and thus they remain useful articles even when imagined separately. What makes a utilitarian function "intrinsic" to an article? The most relevant definition in the Oxford English Dictionary (cited three times by Justice Thomas for its definitions of "design," "capable," and "applied") 163 is " [b] elonging to the thing in itself, or by its very nature; inherent, essential, proper; 'of its own.'" 164 The definition apparently rests on a metaphysical distinction between being a hammer and merely being used as a hammer. It is obviously an elusive standard, but it is the standard that the statute stipulates once the question of separability is made to turn on whether the separately-identified feature is a "useful article" and thus not copyrightable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work.
The narrowest interpretation of an "intrinsic" utilitarian function might limit the concept to situations in which an article's design is dictated by that function. Indeed, one treatise writer has promoted the "dictated" standard as the ultimate test for separability. 165 That standard would exclude almost nothing from copyright since very few utilitarian designs are dictated by function. The shape of car bodies and dresses are not dictated by their function-hence the multitude of different car models and designer gowns that all accommodate the underlying utilitarian functions. The legislative history of the separability test is clear that "even if the appearance of an article is determined by aesthetic (as opposed to functional) a 'useful article' is not an all-or-nothing proposition; the issue must be addressed on a case-by-case basis."). 162 Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1011. 163 Id. at 1009-10, 1014. 164 Definition of "intrinsic," OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ intrinsic (last visited Mar. 29, 2018). 165 2 PATRY, supra note 56, at § 3:146 ("The inquiry here is simply whether the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features are dictated by the form or function of the utilitarian aspects of the useful article. If they are, they are not capable of existing independently of those aspects. If the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features are not dictated by the form or function of the utilitarian aspects of the useful article, they can be said to be capable of existing independently of those aspects and hence are protectable."). See also Shahshahani, supra note 76, at 860, arguing that copyright should be denied only when protection would inhibit the efficient production of the useful article. the separability test is still applicable. The Court itself in Star Athletica interpreted its separability standard to deny protection for the shape, cut, and dimensions of the uniforms, despite the fact that those features were clearly not dictated by their utilitarian functions. The cases interpreting the definition of "useful article" have never required that the design be dictated by function. In the rare instance in which the design of a feature is in fact dictated by the function it must perform, that design would usually be barred from copyright in any case by the merger doctrine. 167 166 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55. See also, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 79, § 924.2(B) ("The fact that a useful article could have been designed differently or the fact that an artistic feature is not necessary to or dictated by the utilitarian aspects of that article is irrelevant to [the separability] analysis."); Ginsburg, supra note 37, at 2 ("Whatever 'separability' means, it excludes more designs than would a test that merely inquires whether there exist other designs for the same kind of useful article."). 167 Separability determines whether design features of useful articles are eligible for copyright as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works. However, qualifying works must still meet the normal standards for copyright. As Justice Thomas noted, the decision in Star Athletica did "not today hold that the surface decorations are copyrightable." Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1012 n.1. The standards of copyrightability are set out in § 102(a) of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). Copyright subsists "in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. . . ." Id. Fixation in some imagined medium is assumed as part of Judge Thomas' separability test. The work must also be "original," which in copyright law means only that the work must be an independent creation as opposed to a copy of a preexisting work. E.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) ("'Original' in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work 'owes its origin' to the 'author.'") (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884)). "Originality in this context 'means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.'" Id. at 103 (quoting HoagueSprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer, Inc., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)). The work, however, must also be "a work of authorship," which according to the Supreme Court in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991), requires that "it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity." In Feist, the Court embraced a quantitative standard, demanding only "more than a de minimis quantum of creativity," id. at 363, and noted, "[t]o be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice." Id. at 345. The graphic designs held separable in Star Athletica might well have pushed up against even this minimal requirement of creativity. However, on remand from the Supreme Court, the plaintiff reached a settlement with the defendant's insurer and the case was dismissed over the objection of the defendant. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 2017 WL 3446292 (W.D. Tenn. 2017).
If the design of a product feature is dictated by the function it must serve, another limitation on copyright becomes relevant. As summarized by Professor Goldstein, "Courts will withhold copyright even from a work's original expression in cases where the work's underlying idea can effectively be expressed in only one way." 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 2.3.2. This limitation is designed to implement the exclusion from copyright of "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery," 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012), in circumstances in which there is a merger of the idea and its expression. The "merger" doctrine is often traced to the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (forms necessary to implement an accounting system are not copyrightable). It has been extended to situations in which an idea can be expressed in only a limited number of ways. Aside from being dictated by function, what else might render a design's utilitarian function "intrinsic" and thus leave the design unprotectable as a useful article even when imagined separately? Several decades ago, I wrote an article arguing that the separability of design features from the utilitarian aspects of useful articles should turn on the extent to which the design reflects utilitarian as opposed to aesthetic influences. 168 That approach was adopted by the Second Circuit in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Company, 169 and also made appearances in other circuits.
170
The approach was suggested to the Supreme Court as a test for separability in Star Athletica.
171
Justice Thomas rejected it, commenting that the approach "would require the decisionmaker to consider evidence of the creator's design methods, purposes, and reasons. . . . The statute's text makes clear, however, that our inquiry is limited to how the article and feature are perceived, not how or why they were designed."
172
From this perspective, the issue is now whether we would perceive the design feature as being a useful article, or a normal part . If copyright protection for a separated design feature would effectively monopolize the underlying idea, method of operation, concept, or discovery, the merger doctrine can be invoked to deny protection. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 2.5.3 ("If an industrial design's shape is mandated by its function, copyright law's merger doctrine would bar protection in any event.") (footnote omitted). 168 See generally Denicola, supra note 37. "The exclusion of industrial design from the scope of copyright is best understood as an attempt to bar forms influenced in significant measure by utilitarian concerns. Thus, copyright is reserved to product features and shapes that reflect even in their utilitarian environment the unconstrained aesthetic perspective of the artist." Id. at 748. 169 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987) ("To state the Denicola test in the language of conceptual separability, if design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements. Conversely, where design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer's artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences, conceptual separability exists."). 170 See, e.g., Pivot Point Int'l v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F. thereof, even when it is imagined separately. What will determine this perception? The more the features of a design reflect a utilitarian function, the more likely we are to intuitively perceive that function as "intrinsic" to the article. The more likely we are, in other words, to perceive it as being a hammer and thus a useful article rather than a three-dimensional sculptural work merely capable of being used as a hammer. We perceive the shape of a car body or the design of a shovel or the threedimensional designs of the uniforms in Star Athletica, for example, as having intrinsic utilitarian functions because their designs seem calculated to fulfill those functions. On the other hand, the statuette in Mazer, although used as a lamp base, is not perceived as a useful article after separation because its design does not appear to be specifically tailored for that use and thus we no longer recognize its utilitarian function after separation. If the statuette in Mazer survives the separability test because it is not perceived as a useful article once it is separated from the lamp, the same should be true of a more abstract sculptural work that has similarly been enlisted as a lamp base. In rejecting the marketability standard, Justice Thomas specifically sought to avoid any test that "threatens to prize popular art over other forms," or rests on "judicial aesthetic preferences."
we judges should not let our own view of styles of art interfere with the decisionmaking process in this area. Denicola suggests that the shape of a Mickey Mouse telephone is copyrightable because its form is independent of function, and '[a] telephone shape owing more to Arp, Brancusi, or Moore than Disney may be equally divorced from utilitarian influence.' [Denicola, supra note 37] at 746.
See also, e.g., Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985) ("We find no support in the statutory language or legislative history for the claim that merely because a utilitarian article falls within a traditional art form it is entitled to a lower level of scrutiny in determining its copyrightability."). But see Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("But we can see no justification, at least in the circumstances of this case, for extending the nondiscrimination principle of Bleistein to include action having an unintentional, disproportionate impact on one style of artistic expression. Such an extension of the nondiscrimination principle would undermine other plainly legitimate goals of copyright law in this case the congressional directive that copyright protection should not be afforded to industrial designs."). In its simplest form, Star Athletica's test for separability appears to be whether we still perceive the separated feature as a useful article, or a normal part of a useful article, because we recognize its intrinsic utilitarian function even after we imagine it separately. Whether the perception of an intrinsic function can be informed by evidence relating to the factors that influenced the design is unclear.
D. The Problem of Overall Shape
Whether the overall shape of a useful article can ever be eligible for copyright protection has been a vexing question. The Copyright Office has been adamant that overall shapes can never satisfy the separability standard. Esquire, Inc. v 180 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 79, § 924.2(B) ("Merely analogizing the general shape of a useful article to a work of modern sculpture or an abstract sculpture does not satisfy the conceptual separability test, because it does not provide an objective basis for visualizing the artistic features and the useful article as separate and independent works.") (citing Esquire, 591 F.2d at 804). The arguments against copyright in overall shapes offered by the Copyright Office in Esquire are hardly compelling. The Copyright Office's brief to the court expressed concern that copyright for overall shape could extend to shapes mandated by the function of the article, thus providing the copyright owner with a monopoly over the sale of some useful products.
181
In such cases, however, the merger doctrine already protects the public interest in assess to the mandated feature.
182
The brief also argued that consumer preference for uniformity of shape for certain useful articles would be undermined. 183 However, the requirement of originality, which prohibits copyright in pre-existing matter that has been copied by the claimant, would bar copyright claims in the traditional shapes of consumer goods. 184 Finally, the brief worried about claims to basic product shapes such as circles, squares, and rectangles.
185
These too, however, are already excluded from copyright by the originality requirement. 186 The complete exclusion of overall shapes cannot be reconciled with other decisions that demonstrate no such reluctance. The overall shapes of coin banks, for example, have consistently received protection when the normal prerequisites of copyright have been satisfied, despite their apparent status as useful articles.
187
Copyright has also been extended to the overall shape of products including bear paw slippers, Star Athletica offers no definitive statement on the status of overall shapes. Two comments, however, could be read to support the Copyright Office's longstanding exclusionary rule. The Court describes its separability test as applicable to a "feature" of the design of a useful article, arguably referring to something less than the whole of the design. In context, however, that term can equally be understood simply as the label for whatever subject matter the claimant seeks to copyright. 192 Second, Justice Thomas, at one point, states that "there necessarily would be some aspects of the original useful article 'left behind' if the feature were conceptually removed," 193 again perhaps implying that the claim cannot relate to the entire shape. That comment, however, is made only in the context of emphasizing that the "imagined remainder" 194 need not be a functioning useful article.
Can any overall shapes survive the Supreme Court's new test for separability, which asks whether the identified subject matter is eligible for protection as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work or ineligible because it is a useful article? Justice Thomas assures us that two-dimensional pictorial features can satisfy that test even if their shape corresponds to the surface shape of the useful article on which they appear-a design etched on a guitar or a fresco painted on a dome, for example-because the features do not replicate the useful articles.
195
Can threedimensional sculptural features whose shapes correspond to the overall shape of a useful article similarly survive if they too do not replicate the useful article? We know from Star Athletica that the overall shape of a cheerleading uniform and a shovel do not satisfy the separability standard because they are useful articles.
196
The same is undoubtedly true of the overall shapes of most useful articles. But the overall shape of a useful article is not always itself a useful article. The shape can qualify for copyright as a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work, provided that it does not have an "intrinsic utilitarian function" as required under the statute's definition of "useful article." 197 Consider again the statuette used as a lamp base in Mazer. Assume that the 1950's manufacturer ran a more diversified business, offering, in addition to 192 Under the definition of "useful article," an article that is normally a part of a useful article is itself considered a "useful article." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of "useful article"). Thus, protection for the shape of a part of a larger useful article technically covers the overall shape of a "useful article." lamps, matching cigarette lighters in which the head of an identical dancing figure lifts to expose the internal lighting mechanism. Or imagine the Mazer statuette as a coin bank or a Wi-Fi antenna. The statuette is now the overall shape of a useful article. It would be odd to conclude that the statuette is copyrightable when used as a lamp base, but not when the utilitarian aspects of the useful article have been internalized within the exact same sculptural work. The statuette is "separable" in all these contexts because once imagined separately it does not have an intrinsic utilitarian function. After separation, we no longer recognize it as a useful article. If the desire to preclude protection for overall shapes is based on the fear of extending copyright protection to industrial design, 198 that fear is overstated. Few overall shapes will survive the test in Star Athletica. Hostility toward the remaining few seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's new-found tolerance for exactly those outcomes.
199
V. OLD CASES AND NEW CASES
The new approach to separability propounded in Star Athletica can be evaluated by applying it to past disputes. Consider the contemporary outdoor street lights that were refused registration in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 200 or the automobile wheel covers that were denied copyright protection in Norris Industries, Inc. v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. 201 Those cases were decided under a rule that completely barred the overall shapes of useful articles. Star Athletica may invite a more nuanced analysis. Once imagined separately, are the overall shapes still perceived as having intrinsic utilitarian functions and thus disqualified as useful articles from receiving protection as sculptural works? In both cases, the answer is almost certainly "yes." The shapes of the lights and wheel covers replicate the original useful articles, just as do the overall shapes of a dress or shovel. We perceive them as useful articles, and they thus fail to satisfy the separability standard. 202 The court in Norris responded to the claimant's argument that since the wire wheel covers were not very efficient at keeping dirt and debris from reaching the wheels, they should not be considered useful articles. "As the Register observes, however, the efficiency of a utilitarian article is irrelevant for copyright 
203
According to the court, conceptual separability turned on "whether the design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer's artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences." 204 Judge Ripple said the mannequin's facial features were the product of artistic choices, and hence were copyrightable. 205 That focus on the design process is now barred by Star Athletica. 206 However, the same lack of utilitarian influences on the facial design relied upon by Judge Ripple also make it unlikely that the specific face, once separated from the utilitarian article, will be perceived as a useful article under the test in Star Athletica. It is easy to recognize the separated face as an artistic work with no intrinsic utilitarian function and thus eligible for copyright as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work.
The two contemporary belt buckles held copyrightable in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.
207 present a more difficult issue. The subject matter of the plaintiff's claim was never quite clear. The Second Circuit's opinion refers to the copyrightability of the plaintiff's "belt buckles." 208 Considered as a whole, that claim may be problematic under Star Athletica. The overall shapes of belt buckles, even interestingly-designed ones, are still likely to be perceived as useful articles and hence ineligible for copyright as sculptural works. However, the court's analysis seemed primarily focused on the surface contours of the buckles. 209 A subsequent Second Circuit decision refers to the "ornamented surfaces of the buckles" in purposes." 696 F.2d at 922 n.8. That is an entirely sensible proposition. However, as the design becomes less and less efficient at accomplishing a utilitarian function, we may be less and less likely to perceive the design as having an intrinsic utilitarian purpose and thus less likely to recognize it as a useful article that is ineligible for copyright protection. perhaps analogous to a western belt buckle bearing an engraving of a covered wagon. If we understand the claimed features as limited to the surface designs, the court's decision, although not its analysis, may well survive Star Athletica. The Second Circuit relied on "the primary ornamental aspect" of the buckles, noting they had been accepted by the Metropolitan Museum of Art for its permanent collection and had been worn by users as ornamentation for parts of the body other than the waist.
211
This focus on whether the work can be perceived as art is inconsistent with Star Athletica.
212
The emphasis now is on whether the work is still perceived as a useful article. To the extent that the plaintiff's claim is focused on the surface contours of the buckles, the separated features have no intrinsic utilitarian function. They will not be perceived as useful articles and thus remain eligible for copyright as pictorial, graphic or sculptural works.
The Supreme Court's test for separability does not necessarily make hard cases easy. In Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 213 the plaintiff claimed copyright in four human torso forms that were used to display clothing. The polystyrene forms, two male and two female, had hollow backs to hold the excess fabric of the displayed garments. One male and one female torso were unclad for the purpose of displaying shirts; the other two forms were sculpted with shirts in order to display sweaters and jackets. 214 The court held that the forms were not copyrightable under the separability test because their designs were "inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian feature, the display of clothes." 215 After Star v. Athletica, the result would not turn directly on the connection between form and function, but instead on whether that connection would lead us to perceive the forms as useful articles with an intrinsic utilitarian function. Their polystyrene construction is probably irrelevant since the copyright claim goes to the sculptural shape rather than the composition. Ultimately, the inquiry would be whether the hollowed-out backs and other features of the designs would cause an observer to perceive them as mannequins rather than as sculptures of human torsos-a question with no easy answer. presents an equally difficult issue. The designer had originally created a wire sculpture with a continuous undulating form, and later had the thought of using that form for a bicycle rack. 217 To accomplish that adaptation, the upper loops of the original wire design were widened to allow bikes to be parked under, as well as over, the rack's curves; the ends were straightened to permit installation in the ground; and the wire was replaced with standard steam pipe bent into form. 218 Judge Oakes held that the design was not copyrightable:
[i]t seems clear that the form of the rack is influenced in significant measure by utilitarian concerns and thus any aesthetic elements cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements. . . . Form and function are inextricably intertwined in the rack, its ultimate design being as much the result of utilitarian pressures as aesthetic choices. 219 This focus on the process of design is now precluded by Star Athletica. 220 However, the utilitarian influences on the design may well affect our perception of it as a bicycle rack rather than simply a piece of modern sculpture. If we perceive the design as having an intrinsic utilitarian function, it is a useful article that is ineligible for copyright as a sculptural work. The case for protection may be stronger after Star Athletica, but the outcome is far from certain. 221 Finally, there is no reason to anticipate a windfall to the fashion industry. Clothing clearly retains its status as a useful article after Star Athletica. Fashion designs-the "shape, cut, and dimensions" 222 of apparel-are still perceived as useful articles even when imagined separately under the Court's test for separability, and thus generally remain ineligible for copyright as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 216 Brandir Int'l v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 217 Id. at 1146. 218 Id. at 1147. 219 Id. at 1146-47. 220 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1015 (2017). 221 Assuming separability, there may well be a debatable issue as to whether the work reflects the "minimal degree of creativity" necessary for copyright. See Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); see also supra note 167. The functionality of the useful article after the separation of the claimed design feature is irrelevant under Star Athletica, 231 and a primarily artistic purpose is not itself sufficient to satisfy the independent-existence requirement. The latter now demands that the separated feature be eligible for protection as a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work because it is not itself a useful article-an issue that the court in Jetmax never reached.
Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc. 232 is more promising. The case involved a claim of copyright in a bird silhouette on the plaintiff's Sparrow Clip clothespins. Prior to Star Athletica, the court had granted a summary judgment upholding the validity of the copyright after asking whether "the design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer's artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences."
233
According to the court, the bird feature was the product of the designer's "artistic judgment" that "was not constrained by functional considerations." 234 Upon reconsideration after Star Athletica, the court again upheld the copyrightability of the bird portion of the Sparrow Clip. Tracking the Supreme Court's analysis, the court found that the bird feature would qualify for protection as a sculptural work if imagined separately. "The Star Athletica Court noted that the design feature must qualify as a nonuseful pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work. . . . However, once the bird portion is removed from the clothespin, what is the usefulness of hanging the bird from a rod or hanging the bird on a string by its beak?" 235 Courts of Appeal will soon be required to parse Star Athletica for themselves. If their past decisions on separability are any guide, a quick consensus is unlikely.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In the absence of a general design protection statute, copyright protection for commercial products remains a crucial issue for designers and manufacturers. The lower court in Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands counted nine competing tests to 230 Id. at *6. 231 See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. . 1987) ). 234 Id. at *12. 235 Design Ideas, 2017 WL 2662473 at *3.
